Dereliction of Duty

In the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), dereliction of duty means that one willfully, through negligence or culpable inefficiency, fails to perform one's expected duties. Ineptitude is a defense against the charge. Civilian dereliction is usually classed in common law as criminal or civil negligence, recklessness or malpractice.

Unfortunately for all of us, the Vietnam War created a kind of intellectual exhaustion. Not only were there few real professional (meaning without the prejudice of political interest) contemporary analyses, ambivalence in the years following has meant that truly valuable histories have been overlooked.

In Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies That Led to Vietnam, (Harper, 1998) Colonel (then Major) H.R. McMaster, Ph.D., unearthed disturbing evidence that America's top leaders – and its senior military officials – in the 1960s and '70s forgot their responsibility to the American public while manipulating the country into a vicious war that it could not win.

McMaster received his B.A. from the United States Military Academy in 1984 and his M.A. and Ph.D. in American history from the University of North Carolina in 1994 and 1996, respectively. Col. McMaster taught American History at West Point from 1994 to 1996. He is currently commanding the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment in Iraq.

For years the popular myth surrounding the Vietnam War was that the Joint Chiefs of Staff knew what it would take to win but were consistently thwarted or ignored by the politicians in power. McMaster shattered this and other misconceptions about the military and Vietnam in Dereliction of Duty. He stresses two elements in discussing America's failure in Vietnam: the hubris of Johnson and his advisors and the weakness of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dereliction of Duty provides both a thorough exploration of the military's role in determining Vietnam policy and a telling portrait of the men most responsible.

Only the most exceptional military commanders avoid the trap of fighting the last war. Military hierarchies are bureaucracies, and its members bureaucrats, with all that implies. If the Army hierarchy was among the culpable in Vietnam, how should we judge the assessments, justifications, strategies, and tactics of that same bureaucracy today? The mantra of “following the advice of my commanders,” may be a hollow one.